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ABSTRACT 
 The literature describes how changing demographics and cultural factors in recent 
generations may be contributing to gender differences regarding religion.  The present 
exploratory study uses cross-sectional survey data from the 2012 and 2014 General Social 
Survey to examine the gender differences in religiosity for Millennials, Generation X, and Baby 
Boomers.  The findings show significant gender and demographic results for attendance at 
religious services, frequency of prayer, belief in the Bible as the word of God, and belief in life 
after death for all three generations.  Baby Boomer and Millennial women attend religious 
services more than men, but there is no gender difference for Generation X.  However, Women 
from all generations pray more than men.  For belief in the Bible as the word of God, only Baby 
Boomer women believe more than men.  Finally, Millennial women and Generation X women 
believe in life after death more than men, whereas there is no gender difference in belief for 
Baby Boomers.  Implications of the findings are discussed.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 The longstanding trend demonstrated in the Literature regarding gender and religion in 
America is that women are more religious than men (Anderson and Young, 2004; Roberts and 
Yamane, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2015).  Since the 1800’s, women have consistently had 
stronger religious beliefs than men and participated in religious activities more than men as 
well (Putnam and Campbell, 2012; Roberts and Yamane, 2012).  Regarding affiliation, the 
aspect of religiosity that marks identification with a particular religious tradition (see Ellison, 
Gay, and Glass, 1989), women identify as Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, and Mainline 
Protestants in higher numbers than men (Roberts and Yamane, 2012; Pew Research Center, 
2015).  This is significant because this list comprises the three primary religious traditions in in 
the United States (Roberts and Yamane, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2015).  In terms of 
numbers, women make up 55% of the Mainline and Evangelical polity and 54% of Catholics 
(Pew Research Center, 2015).  Nevertheless, religious affiliation is criticized in the literature as a 
less than perfect measure of personal identification and more of a measure of family or ethnic 
background (Trzebiatowska, 2012).  Disparities between attendance numbers and affiliation 
underscore this issue (Trzebiatowska, 2012).   
Rather than look at affiliation per se, recent studies on religiosity are increasingly 
examining religious changes through the context of behaviors and beliefs (Meselko and 
Kubzansky, 2006; Schwadel, 2011; Gay and Lynxwiler, 2013).  Examining the gender difference 
through these specific parameters of religiosity—behavior and beliefs—shows that women still 
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have higher numbers than men in both areas (Pew Research Center, 2008).  Specifically 
concerning beliefs, 77% of women ages 18 and older are more likely to say that they are certain 
about the existence of God or a universal spirit compared to 65% of men (Pew Research Center, 
2008).  Additionally, women are more likely to pray daily compared to men, 66% compared to 
49%, respectively (Pew Research Center, 2008).  Regarding importance of religion, 63% of 
women feel that religion is important to their lives compared to 49% of men (Pew Research 
Center, 2008). Finally, attendance at religious services is also considerably higher for women.  
The research shows that 44% of women attend religious services compared to 34% of men 
(Pew Research Center, 2008).   
Importantly, Becker and Hofmeister (2001) demonstrated that for women, increased 
religious involvement is tied to how salient religion is for them, their beliefs, and then 
involvement in the religious subculture rather than simply for family formation and the birth of 
children.  For men on the other hand, structural factors such as full-time employment and 
family formation are more directly related to increases in religious participation, rather than 
salience of religious beliefs per se due to a likely association of religious participation with 
maturity (Becker and Hofmeister, 2001).   
Although Hertel (1995) used General Social Survey data from 1972 to 1990 to 
demonstrate that full-time employment for married women corresponded to a decrease in 
religious involvement for them and their spouses, the study by Becker and Hofmeister (2001) 
controlled for additional variables that eliminated this result.  Instead, Becker and Hofmeister 
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(2001) found some support for the negative effect of modern attitudes on religious 
participation.  As men and women develop more egalitarian views of gender, there is a 
tendency to develop more individualistic orientations toward institutions such as family and 
religion (Wuthnow, 1988; Ammerman and Roof, 1995).  More specifically, the relevance of 
religious authority becomes salient to the decision to attend religious services and this effect is 
stronger for women than men (Becker and Hofmeister, 2001).  However, Becker and 
Hofmeister (2001) point out that despite the fact that some studies point to a direct causal 
relationship between individualism and decreased religious participation, others argue that 
socialization is a key factor.  Sherkat (1998) argues that individuals raised in strict religious 
contexts maybe be socialized against the individualism that would cause them to question the 
salience of religion, whereas the same can be said of the individuals who are raised to reject 
religion—they may not have any inclination to bring their children to church on the basis that 
their socialization never instilled that desire.  Socialization does not occur in a vacuum.  
Specifically, Brooks and Bolzendahl (2004) emphasize that the effects of popular culture 
ideology mitigate the influence of socialization on attitudes toward gender equality.  They 
specifically look at how gender attitudes shift over the life course and posit that while 
childhood socialization does play a role, it is by no means deterministic of the attitudes that 
individuals have in later life (Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2004).  This point regarding salience of 
religion is relevant to the study conducted by Becker and Hofmeister (2001), who specifically 
address that attitudes toward religious salience vary through the life course.  This lends weight 
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to the need to expand the literature by examining how religious beliefs and participation vary 
for different cohorts in various points in the life course, which is part of the aim of my study.   
In addition to this, the salience of examining gender difference among cohorts is also 
critical because of the changing ideological culture concerning gender equality.  The Baby 
Boomers were heavily influenced by the gender revolution and the entry of women into the 
workforce, which has resulted in lasting effects on religion (Roof, 1999).  Most notably, religious 
attitudes and behavioral differences between men and women were beginning to be reduced, 
particularly regarding women who were employed full-time outside the home (Roof, 1999).  For 
Generation X, progress toward gender equality was still something to be embraced and 
explored (Flory and Miller, 2000).  They exhibited a similar pattern as the Baby Boomers, where 
increasing numbers of women in the workforce coupled with increasing divorce rates had a 
strong impact on this generation (Flory and Miller, 2000).  Generation X’ers became more 
individualistic, less religious, and more accepting of the culture of gender equality (Pew 
Research Center (Flory and Miller, 2000).  The children of the Baby Boomers, the Millennials, 
are the generation that has grown up with the idea that gender equality is normal (Twenge, 
2011).  Additionally, recent research shows that both male and female Millennials are highly 
supportive of women in the workforce and favor an egalitarian partnership in the household 
(Gerson, 2010; Twenge, 2011).  The purpose of this research is to examine the gender 
difference among Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials regarding religious beliefs and 
behaviors.    
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Generations 
 The concept of generations most influentially traces back to Karl Mannheim ([1928] 
1952).  Mannheim (1952) describes generations as social constructs that are created when 
period effects, or key historical occurrences and events, are experienced by a cohort of similar 
age.  The impact of period effects on attitudes and behaviors as well as the awareness 
associated with having experienced history in a social way is key to the demarcation of a 
particular cohort or generation (Mannheim, 1952).  As such, when pivotal events do not occur 
or when social change is slow, Mannheim acknowledges that distinct generations may not be 
distinguishable (1952).  
 According to Mannheim (1952) a key period of time for the social construction of the 
unique character of a cohort or generation is between 17 and 25 years old.  The cohort is 
marked by particular attitudes and behaviors that distinguish it from other generations 
(Mannheim, 1952).  More specifically, late adolescence and early adulthood—also known as 
emerging adulthood (see Arnett, 2000)—are the pivotal times of developing distinct outlooks 
on political and social matters (Mannheim, 1952).  Differences of attitude and behavior toward 
gender issues and religion based on generation are common examples in the literature (Pew 
Research Center, 2008; 2015; Taylor, 2014).  These differences are important because attitudes 
and behaviors developed in young adulthood are believed to be highly influential of life 
decisions and attitudes later in the life course (Mannheim, 1952).  In other words, generations 
6 
 
are believed to base many of their decisions in later adulthood based on views and opinions 
they formed early in life, based on the unique historical experiences of their cohort.  
 On the other hand, more recent research indicates that changes in cultural ideology can 
have a profound impact on individuals that is stronger than generational shifts (Twenge, 
Campbell, and Gentile, 2012; Twenge and Campbell, 2013).  Specifically, changes in culture 
including increased individualism, changes in worldviews, and parenting and educational shifts 
are cited as being more influential than period events on generations.  Markus and Kitayama 
(2010) posit that individuals influence culture reflexively—culture shapes individuals and 
individuals, in turn, shape culture in such a way that cultural level changes are stronger in some 
cases than generational shifts (Morling and Lamoreaux, 2008).  That being said, researchers also 
acknowledge that generational and cultural changes happen slowly and linearly over time 
(Twenge and Campbell, 2013).    
 For the sake of this research, I will use the generational operationalizations that are 
most common in the literature.  I will also be using the terms “generation” and “cohort” 
interchangeably, even though in both instances I am specifically referring to birth cohort as 
designated by the literature.  Accordingly, the Baby Boom generation consists of those born 
between 1946 and 1964, which means that these individuals are currently between 51 and 69 
years old (Twenge and Campbell, 2013; Gay and Lynxwiler, 2013).  Additionally, Generation X is 
considered to include everyone born between 1965 and either 1979 (Twenge and Campbell, 
2013) or 1980 (Gay and Lynxwiler, 2013; Fry, 2015).  As such, Generation X’ers are currently 
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between 35 and 50 years old.  Since, the Pew Research Center uses the 1965 to 1980 
designation, this is the operationalization that I will use as well (Fry, 2015).  Finally, the 
Millennials are the generation born between 1997 and 1981 according to the latest publications 
by the Pew Research Center (Fry, 2015).  This makes the current ages of Millennials between 18 
and 34 years old. 
Baby Boomers 
The relationship between each of the generations and religion is unique, yet there is a 
common thread that ties them together.  That unifying element involves the significant cultural 
shifts that occurred in the 1960’s and are still impacting religion today.  It is important to 
understand these key historical events in order to both understand the factors that are 
currently impacting religious practices and beliefs and to understand what the future of 
American religion might look like.   
  America was in the midst of social, religious, and political upheaval during the time 
when the Baby Boomers were reaching young adulthood (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  However, 
prior to the tumultuous changes of the 1960’s, the big three—Protestantism, Catholicism, and 
Judaism—were the dominant cultural and religious force in United States (Roof 1993; Roof and 
McKinney 1987).  Religious uniformity and homogeny were the trend in the 1950’s and even 
identity as an American coincided with religious self-identification as a Protestant, Catholic or 
Jew (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  However, significant changes were to occur in the next decade 
that would change the face of American religion.   
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A watershed moment occurred in 1960 when John F. Kennedy was elected to the 
presidency. The election of a Catholic president was a signal that the time of Protestant 
domination was over (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Then, in 1962, school prayer was deemed 
unconstitutional signaling that the tides of traditional American religion were crashing and 
something new was taking shape—a desire for pluralism and diversity both socially and in 
terms of religion (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  The evidence lay in the changes occurring in the 
membership of the mainline faiths.  The “big three” traditional religious affiliations lost 
members in significant numbers during the 1960’s (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Baby boomers 
who had been reared in one of the mainline faiths were defecting in their early twenties, and it 
was becoming increasingly difficult for religious bodies to attract new members (Roof 1993; 
Roof and McKinney 1987).  Additionally, many young Americans were exploring alternative 
religious movements and a large number were becoming religiously unaffiliated (Perrin 1989; 
Roof, 1993; Roof and McKinney, 1987; Wuthnow, 1976).  
As a group, the Baby Boomers were developing a highly individualistic identity and 
worldview (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  They were less interested in the faiths they knew from 
their youth and more interested in self-focused introspection and “enlightenment” (Johnson 
1985; Roof 1993; Roof and McKinney 1987).  Rather than homogeny and cultural conformity, 
the collective mindset of the youth involved cultural and moral relativism and the embrace of 
the non-traditional in all things including social and religious issues (Hoge 1974; Johnson 1985; 
Perrin 1989; Roof and McKinney 1987).  Due in no small way to changes in higher education and 
availability of new technologies like the birth control pill, Baby Boomers were able to make 
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much more calculated decisions about the trajectory of their lives than previous generations 
(Roof, 1993; Roof and McKinney, 1987).  They were choosing when they would get married, 
start families, begin careers, and participate in religion (Hoge, Benton, and Luidens 1993; Roof 
1993; Roof and McKinney 1987).  Additionally, many middle class, college-educated Baby 
Boomers embraced the liberal movements of the time including issues of gender and racial 
equality, gay rights, antiwar protests, environmental concerns, and new religions (Hoge 1974; 
Johnson 1985; Roof 1993; Roof and McKinney 1987; Wilhelm, Rooney, and Tempel 2007).  This 
combination of pluralism and secular humanism resulted in the Baby Boomers adopting more 
permissive sexual behaviors, challenging gender roles, and delaying marriage (Roof 1993; Roof 
and McKinney 1987).  This generation was rejecting many of the common values that 
Americans were believed to hold concerning social issues, including traditional views of gender, 
chastity prior to marriage, and low divorce rates (Roof 1993; Roof and McKinney 1987).  
Though the counterculture movement had an impact on many young Baby Boomers, a 
large majority of young adults were not involved in the protests, the drugs, and the other more 
esoteric elements of the “age of Aquarius” (Wuthnow, 1976).   Nevertheless, the Baby Boomers 
as a whole were highly influenced by the general cultural Zeitgeist of tolerance and 
individualism that flourished in the 1960’s (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  The combination of 
pluralism and individualism directly impacted the way that Baby Boomers would participate in 
faith institutions and develop their religious beliefs (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Social scientists 
refer to this highly private and individualized approach to religious faith as the “new 
voluntarism” (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Essentially Americans’ conception of relativism 
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expanded to include religious matters, and they increasingly began to view religion as a 
personal preference (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  This affected membership with churches 
because religion became more focused with the private, personal search for religion separate 
from external religious authority.  Additionally, this affected traditional dogmatic belief because 
the traditional locus of religious authority shifted from the clergy of the religious institution to 
the individual—meaning suddenly everyone could be his or her own religious authority.  As 
such, one’s religious beliefs became emotionally and experientially grounded amalgamations of 
various religious traditions that were privately acquired, interpreted, and held without the 
official oversight of traditional religious overseers.       
In the literature, this development is called “Sheilaism” and it is fundamental not only to 
the religious faith structure of Baby Boomers, but also continues to influence the belief 
development of Generation X and the Millennials (Roof and McKinney, 1987; Flory and Miller, 
2000; Arnett and Jensen, 2002).  To elaborate on the terminology, Robert Bellah et al. (1985) 
interviewed a woman named “Sheila” who described her religious beliefs in terms of something 
she called “Sheilaism.” This was her personal, individualized perception of God and her 
relationship to Him; “I believe in God.  I’m not a religious fanatic.  I can’t remember the last 
time I went to church.  My faith has carried me a long way.  It’s Sheilaism.  Just my own little 
voice” (Bellah et al., 1985).  A key component of “Sheilaism” is the lack of need to attend 
religious services or be members of a religious congregation (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Faith 
is personal and private—it does not depend on community with other believers or oversight by 
religious authorities (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  It is the individuals “own little voice.”  
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For the Baby Boomers, the ideological embrace of individualism, moral relativism, and 
pluralism can be traced back to the strong sense of disillusionment they were experiencing with 
traditional authority figures in various spheres of society (Hoge 1974; Johnson 1985; Roof 1993; 
Roof and McKinney 1987).  In one decade, this generation faced a morally suspect war in 
Vietnam, political assassinations, the Watergate scandal, the push for civil rights and gender 
equality, riots, religious contradictions, etc. (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Rather than embrace 
the religious leaders, especially the liberal ones, Baby Boomers were largely avoiding them 
(Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Ironically, the religious centers that were hurting the most for 
members during this time were the mainline institutions with liberal religious views and 
attitudes that should have been more palatable to Baby Boomers (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  
Interestingly, it was actually the conservative Protestant congregations that were doing well 
during this time, particularly the experiential variety that included the Pentecostal and 
evangelical sects (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Though conservative, these were distinctive 
faiths that focused on the spiritual experience of the believer—a highly attractive element to 
the experientially oriented Baby Boomers (Roof and McKinney, 1987).  Nevertheless, a growing 
segment of the population also included those exploring alternative faiths as well as those who 
did not claim any religious affiliation at all—a strongly secular group (Roof and McKinney, 
1987).  This trend toward non-affiliation, or “nones” would continue to grow steadily for the 
next few decades and is now a significant mark of the Millennial generation (Pew Research 
Center, 2010).  Overall, the Baby Boomers’ relationship with religion continues to be 
fundamental to understanding the shifts in American religion for the last fifty years. 
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Generation X 
Generation X is the familiar designation used for the 65 million Americans born between 
1965 and 1980 (Taylor and Gao, 2014).  Douglas Coupland (1991) originally coined the term 
“Generation X” in his well-known book by the same title about three seemingly aimless young 
adults who were finding it difficult to make the transition to adulthood, and the term has 
cemented itself in our collective culture.  However, to understand Generation X fully, it is 
necessary to understand them in context of the two super-cohorts they find themselves 
sandwiched between.  Compared to their predecessors, the Baby Boomers, who number 77 
million and the Millennials, who comprise a staggering 83 million members, Generation X’s 
modest size has led to them being described as the “overlooked” or “marginalized” generation 
(Coupland, 1991; Mitchel, 1995; Taylor, 2014; Taylor and Gao, 2014).   
In important ways, being overshadowed by both the Baby Boomers contributed greatly 
to the unique identity and character of this generation (Coupland, 1991; Flory and Miller, 2000; 
Taylor, 2014).  The profile sketch of Generation X developed by Paul Taylor (2014: 33) describes 
them as “savvy, entrepreneurial loners” that are “distrustful of institutions, especially 
government.” More conservative initially than the Baby Boomers and Millennials, Generation X 
has otherwise been the linear ideological bridge between the two massive generations on 
either side of it (Taylor, 2014).  Flory and Miller (2000) explained that high parental divorce 
rates and constant family relocation resulted in a sense of being disenfranchised among Gen 
X’ers.  Additionally, due to shrinking economic opportunities and competition with Baby 
Boomers, Generation X had considerably fewer career chances (Flory and Miller, 2000).  They 
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were over-educated and underpaid with many Generation X’ers working “McJobs” or jobs in 
the service sector that were distinguished by “low-pay, low-prestige, low-dignity, low benefit, 
and no future” (Coupland, 1991: 5).   
As the first generation to live by the laws established for civil rights and gender equality, 
Generation X’ers considered themselves to be more multicultural than the Baby Boomers, and 
they were more likely to favor social diversity than the Boomers (Flory and Miller, 2000; Taylor, 
2014).  Technologically, Generation X became the first technologically literate generation, and 
they have remained very comfortable with it ever since (Taylor, 2014; Flory and Miller, 2000).  
Because Baby Boomer advertisers tended to market to themselves and ignore Generation X, 
the X’ers indulged themselves with self-referential pop culture (Rushkoff and Coupland, 1994).  
 Generation X is somewhat difficult to categorize in terms of religious belief.   For 
religious believers, Generation X’ers tend to favor experiential faith and communion with God 
that is achieved through activities such as dancing and yoga (Bengsten et al., 2013; Flory and 
Miller, 2000).  Additionally, Flory and Miller (2000) remarked about the tendency among X’ers 
to merge lifestyle interests with religious expression in a kind of blurring of the sacred and the 
profane that is foreign to the Baby Boomers.  For example, the incorporation of religious 
themes in tattoo art among religious tattoo artists or the use of Hip Hop in religious self-
expression, etc. (Flory and Miller, 2000).  Although the everyday life demands make it difficult 
for practical expression, a full 75% of Generation X’ers state that religion is highly salient to 
their lives (Bengston et al., 2013).  Additionally, Gen X’ers tend to believe that religion has use 
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for instilling moral values in their children (Bengston et al., 2013).  Generation X believers also 
feel that they are independent thinkers such that they are willing to take breaks from religion in 
order to negotiate difficult doctrinal challenges (Bengston et al., 2013).  Religious Generation 
X’ers are also more likely to believe in free will compared to other generations (Bengston et al., 
2013).   
On the other hand, Generation X’s secular counterparts also claim to be independent 
thinkers, but for them that translates to religious nonbelief (Bengston et al., 2013).  
Additionally, nonbelieving Gen X’ers tend to have skeptical views of believers and supernatural 
faith over what can be empirically determined through science (Bengston et al., 2013).  This 
generation also is noted for an increasingly hostile view of religion among nonbelievers.   
Specifically, nonbelievers in Generation X are more likely to view religion as illogical and non-
beneficial to society compared to the Baby Boomers (Bengston et al., 2013).   
Additionally, a debate currently exists concerning the role of generations or cohorts in 
determining aspects of religious affiliation.  A recent study by Philip Schwadel (2010) uses the 
General Social Survey to compare religious affiliation probabilities for Baby Boomers and 
Generation X.  Schwadel (2010) discovered that Generation X’ers are less likely than Baby 
Boomers to have a religious preference.  However, Schwadel (2010) also found higher rates of 
disaffiliation from religion for Baby Boomers than Generation X’ers, despite the face that 
Generation X has more members that do not affiliate with a religion than the Baby Boom 
cohort.   The explanation that Schwadel (2010) offers for this finding is that more Baby Boomers 
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were likely raised with a religious affiliation than Generation X’ers, making the switch to non-
affiliation more conspicuous among Baby Boomers.  In essence, there are far more Generation 
X’ers that grew up without religion than Baby Boomers (Schwadel, 2010). 
Millennials 
 Neil Howe and William Strauss (1991) coined the term “Millennial” when they first 
sought out to describe the children of the Baby Boomers and older Gen X’ers.  It is 
appropriately the term used to describe the generation that has come of age in the early 2000’s 
and according to the Pew Research Center (2015) the Millennial cohort consists of those born 
between the years 1981 and 1997.  As such, the Millennials are currently between the ages of 
18 and 34 years old.    
The size of this cohort has made them the focus of research and much popular literature 
as of late.  Like their Baby Boomer counterparts, the Millennials are an extremely large group.  
In fact, according to the latest projections by the Pew Research Center (2015) the Millennials 
are expected to exceed the total number of Baby Boomers in 2036, when they are expected to 
total a little over 81 million.  Currently to date they make up about 75.3 million members in the 
United States (Pew Research Center, 2015).    
Religiously, the Millennials are following traditional trends that started with the Baby 
Boomers and continued with Generation X, but with some significant distinctions.  The biggest 
example is probably the growth of the “nones” or those that do not identify with a religious 
tradition (Lipka, 2015).  Compared to the Baby Boomers and Generation X, Millennials have the 
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highest percentage of religiously non-affiliated people of any previous generation in recent 
American history (Lipka, 2015).  According to the findings, about 36% of Millennials do not 
identify with a particular religious faith, while roughly 55% identify with some form of 
Christianity (Lipka, 2015).  Comparatively, 70% of Generation X identified with some Christian 
faith and only 23% identified as religiously non-affiliated (Lipka, 2015).  For the Baby Boomers, 
78% identified with a Christian faith and only 17% constituted the non-affiliated category 
(Lipka, 2015).  These numbers indicate not only an increase in religious non-affiliation, but a 
strong decline in self-identifying as a Christian—at least in the United States.  Nonetheless, as I 
have mentioned previously, affiliation can be criticized as a weak indicator of personal 
religiosity (see Trzebiatowska, 2012).  Still, other research makes the case that a large 
percentage of Millennials are falling into a non-religious state (see Smith, 2009) while at the 
same time others are simply being reared without a solid religious background—making them 
“nones” from childhood, similar to many in Generation X (Sherkat, 2014).   
In contrast, researchers have noted that conservatives and black Protestants are 
exceptions to the trend overall and that they are able to retain more of their members than 
their mainline counterparts (Twenge, 2006).  Still, Smith (2009) found that both conservatives 
and black Protestants have been endured considerable losses compared to the mainline 
denominations—Millennials are dropping out of the former denominations by about 3% 
compared to only 0.5% in the mainline denominations.   
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Regarding investigation into the beliefs systems of Millennials, the most useful study to 
date has been the work contributed by Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett (2002).  Arnett (2002) 
describes the beliefs of young adults as part of his framework for documenting the changing 
nature of the early portion of the life course that he has termed “emerging adulthood.” As part 
of this framework, Arnett (2002) describes how certain adult responsibilities are delayed due to 
the increase of time young adults spend in school and self-exploration in their twenties.  
Delayed responsibilities include marriage, having children, etc. (see Arnett, 2002)—all of which 
have been demonstrated to have an impact on religiosity in the literature (Wuthnow, 2007).  As 
described in his study on the religious beliefs of emerging adults, Arnett (2002) notes that they 
are very individualistic and are prone to creating very customized religious beliefs that fit their 
particular tastes and interests.  Additionally, they pull their beliefs from various different 
religious “toolboxes” in order to construct these religious beliefs and identities (Arnett, 2002).  
Additionally, the findings from this research show that only about 23% of these young adults 
have very conservative beliefs, whereas the remaining 77% are some combination of liberal 
believers who have certain doubts about their religious beliefs, deists, or agnostics/atheists 
(Arnett, 2002).   
As stated previously, there are several demographic variables besides gender that are 
relevant to religiosity in the literature.  Among these is education, income, marriage, having 
children, race, and work status (Wuthnow, 2007; Twenge, 2006; Roberts and Yamane, 2012; 
Putnam and Campbell, 2010).  Although education has had different effects on religiosity over 
time, the current effect seems to be that education is correlated to higher religiosity and more 
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middle class people are present in the pews than were there previously (Putnam and Campbell, 
2010).  Income is also an important factor in the literature, showing that poorer people tend to 
be congregated in Fundamentalist religious traditions such as Pentecostals and Baptists and the 
wealthier people are located in more mainline traditions (Roberts and Yamane, 2012).  
Additionally, marriage and children tend to have a positive relationship with religiosity in the 
literature (Wuthnow, 2007; Roberts and Yamane, 2012).  The logic follows that when people 
get married, settle down and have children they are more likely to seek out a religious 
environment to raise their kids in for the sake of socializing morality into their children.  Race is 
also an important factor as well.  Black Americans tend to participate more in religious affairs 
than white Americans (Roberts and Yamane, 2012).  Also work-status, such as participation in 
the work force, has had interesting effects on religiosity.  Putnam and Campbell (2012) have 
demonstrated that because of the second wave of the feminist movement in the 1960’s and 
the subsequent increase of women in the workforce, certain traditional attitudes have been 
impacted in a progressive direction concerning issues of gender equality.  Also, Mueller and 
Johnson (1975) linked increase participation in the work force with increased participation in 
religious organizations.  Even so, Becker and Hofmeister (2001) concluded that there wasn’t a 
strong connection between employment in the work force and religiosity—at least for women.  
Instead, they stressed the salience of beliefs, which is precisely what I focus on in this paper. 
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Gender Trends and Generations 
 The 1960’s were a pivotal time of progress for American women in terms of 
employment, education, and a general cultural shift toward egalitarianism (Wuthnow, 1989; 
Roof, 1999). As a result of the gender equality movements of second wave feminism, many 
American women were entering the workforce in greater numbers than ever before (Wuthnow, 
1989; Roof, 1999).  By the 1970’s over half of the female population had a job outside the 
home.  This increase of women in the workforce coincided with a decrease in religious 
involvement that eventually plateaued around the mid 1970’s (Wuthnow, 1989).  Attendance at 
religious services once a week went from 49% in 1958 to around 40% in the 1970’s (Wuthnow, 
1989).   
 Education was the other major source of change for Baby Boomers in the 1960’s 
(Wuthnow, 1989).  A huge ideological shift occurred alongside the influx of young adults 
entering higher education (Wuthnow, 1989).  Specifically regarding women, support for gender 
equality in the workplace, family, and other spheres of society was increasing significantly 
(Wuthnow, 1989).  Willingness to elect a woman president increased from one third of the 
population to two thirds by the mid 1970’s (Wuthnow, 1989).  This growing trend toward 
egalitarianism also included more permissive attitudes toward sexuality and divorce (Wuthnow, 
1989).  It was even argued that these Baby Boomers were a “new class” that was distinct from 
the public at large, a proposition that was supported by the face that this group held 20% more 
tolerant views toward homosexuality, gender equality, and legalized abortion than the general 
public (Wuthnow, 1989).   
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 The effect of education and changing ideological attitudes on religion for the Baby 
Boomers was strong (Wuthnow, 1989).  Attendance was down for many Baby Boomers who 
were breaking from the religions of their parents in droves, particularly among the well 
educated (Wuthnow, 1989).  The percentage of Baby Boomers who felt that religion was having 
an increasing influence in society had declined to only 14%, whereas it had previously been at 
69% in the 1950’s (Wuthnow, 1989).  Religious beliefs took a hit as well, with less than half of 
respondents claiming certain belief in God compared to 68% in the previous decade (Wuthnow, 
1989).  College educated Baby Boomers were more likely to experience a decline in their 
religious beliefs compared to those without a college education (Wuthnow, 1989).  However, 
traditional predictors of increased religious involvement for married individuals with children 
still applied to the Baby Boomers (Wuthnow, 1989).  
  The second wave feminist movement of the 1960’s had an enduring impact on 
Generation X and the Millennials (Wuthnow, 2007; Gerson, 2010).   Whereas the Baby Boomers 
had worked hard to fight for gender equality, Generation X celebrated their predecessors’ 
victories and embraced the benefits of more equality between the genders (Flory and Miller, 
2000; Flory and Miller, 2008).  These changes have been reflected in women’s education levels 
as well as their involvement in the workforce, family life, and religion (Wuthnow, 2007; Gerson, 
2010).   
Regarding education, substantially more Generation X women attended and graduated 
from college than Baby Boomer women (Wuthnow, 2007).  Women between the ages of 21 to 
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45 graduated from college at a rate that was 10% to 18% higher in the year 2000 compared to 
women in 1970 (Wuthnow, 2007).  Also, Baby Boomer women with only grade school 
education had higher levels of religious service attendance than Generation X women 
(Wuthnow, 2007).  On the other hand, the numbers for college graduates and those with a 
graduate degree were similar to the Baby Boomer numbers (Wuthnow, 2007).  Nonetheless, 
Generation X women who earned a graduate degree are significantly less likely to attend 
religious services than those with their Bachelor’s degree (Wuthnow, 2007).  Also, there is 
hardly any difference between Generation X men and women who have earned graduate 
degrees in terms of religious attendance (Wuthnow, 2007). 
A similarly large increase in the number of women entering the work force is also 
apparent (Wuthnow, 2007).  Generation X women increased their participation in the work 
force in the year 2000 at a rate that was between 17% and 22% higher than their Baby Boom 
counterparts in 1970 (Wuthnow, 2007).   Additionally, the economy adapted to the changing 
influx of workers, making it more needful to have dual earners than at earlier points in history 
(Wuthnow, 2007).  In turn, the Millennials, both male and female, would naturally view women 
working outside the home as a perfectly natural and often preferable option to being a 
homemaker (Gerson, 2010).  Additionally, women’s employment has been associated with 
sharp decreases in religious attendance for Generation X compared to Baby Boomers 
(Wuthnow, 2007).  Full time workers attend religious services the least, followed by part time 
workers (Wuthnow, 2007).  Generation X women in both categories attend religious services 
less than Baby Boomer women at the same age (Wuthnow, 2007).  On the other hand, female 
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homemakers are much more likely to attend religious services and their numbers closely 
resemble Baby Boomers (Wuthnow, 2007).      
 Regarding traditional predictors of religious involvement, Generation X has been shown 
to be consistent with previous trends (Wuthnow, 2007).  In terms of marriage, married 
Generation X women are more likely to attend religious services than unmarried women and 
the married Gen X’ers resemble the numbers of Baby Boomers very closely (Wuthnow, 2007).  
The biggest contrast is with the unmarried women; unmarried Gen X women are much less 
likely to attend religious services than their Baby Boomer counterparts (Wuthnow, 2007). 
(Wuthnow, 2007).  The same pattern exists for men, although Generation X men attend 
religious services at a fraction of the rate that women do (Wuthnow, 2007).   
 Because women have been influenced to participate in religion based on their 
traditionally designation as caretakers of the family and home, it is worth mentioning how 
children and married life has affected attendance at religious services (Wuthnow, 2007).  A 
consistent predictor in the literature of religious service attendance is the number of children 
one has, where more children correlate to higher attendance (Wuthnow, 2007).  However, for 
Generation X, couples with no children attend religious services at a lower rate than the Baby 
Boomers in a similar circumstance (Wuthnow, 2007).  Interestingly, women with two or more 
children are less likely than Baby Boomers to attend religious services (Wuthnow, 2007).  As 
more Generation X’ers delayed married and having children compared to the Baby Boomers, 
the group that is traditionally associated with higher religious attendance—married couples 
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with children—is far less represented in this cohort and the group that is traditionally linked 
with the lowest religious attendance—singles without children—have a bigger representation 
(Wuthnow, 2007).     
The Millennials are continuing the trend of tolerance and acceptance of diversity that 
began as a movement with the Baby Boomers (Twenge, 2006; Roof, 1993).  The main difference 
is that the Millennials have grown up with diversity from their earliest years—a vast difference 
from the Generation X’ers who were introduced to the concept heavily in the 1990’s and the 
Baby Boomers who fought for it to even exist (Twenge, 2006; Roof, 1993).   
The literature shows that with each successive generation, the attitudes toward gender 
equality are becoming increasingly liberal, though there is still remains a significant gap 
between religious and secular individuals (Putnam and Campbell, 2012).  Nonetheless, women 
in the Millennial generation are being raised in a more egalitarian culture than any previous 
generation, despite the fact that gender inequalities are still strong and persistent in many ways 
today (Putname and Campbell, 2012; Roberts and Yamane, 2012; Twenge, 2006).  As a whole, 
Millennials feel that diversity and tolerance of people with various attributes and orientations 
are normative concepts and that they should be celebrated (Twenge, 2006).   More so than any 
generation before them, they are more liberal on many different social issues including, for 
example, the right to marry for gays and lesbians (Pew Research Center, 2010).  Because of this 
shift, I want to examine more closely the gender differences that exist for Millennials in 
contrast to the Baby Boomers and Generation X in regards to other measures of religiosity 
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besides just affiliation.  I examine specifically the belief differences by gender and the religious 
behavior differences that exist for them.   
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METHODS 
Population and Data  
 For the analysis in this project, I used secondary data from the General Social Survey 
(hereafter GSS).  The GSS is nationally conducted and is a nationally representative survey of 
individuals 18 years of age and older and consisting of English-speakers that live in non-
institutional residences within the United States for the selected years of 2012 and 2014 (Smith, 
Marsden, Hout, and Kim 2013). I used this dataset because this survey contains questions that 
tap religiosity, as well as a variety of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that are 
relevant to the nature of the study.  Additionally, the GSS is considered a reliable source for 
investigating religious beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Sherkat, 2014).  Moreover, using this 
dataset allowed me to analyze data for a relatively large sample of Millennials, Generation 
X’ers, and Baby Boomers in a manageable amount of time.  
 Since the purpose of this study was to investigate the gender differences for several 
religious variables among three different cohorts, I will now briefly outline how I selected 
respondents for the study that fit in the appropriate generational categories of Millennials, 
Generation X’ers, and Baby Boomers.  According to the latest reports, the Pew Research Center 
(2015) now identifies the Millennial generation as those individuals born between 1981 and 
1997.  This means that the youngest Millennials are 19 and the oldest are 34 years old.  
According to the literature, Generation X’ers consist of those born between 1965 and 1980, and 
Baby Boomers are the generation born between 1946 and 1964 (Gay and Lynxwiler, 2013).  My 
26 
 
sample of Millennials, Generation X, and Baby Boomers that meet these qualifications are from 
the years 2012 and 2014 of the GSS to keep the findings as current as possible.  The number of 
Millennials sampled is 794, 966 for Generation X, and 1175 for the Baby Boomers.     
Analytic Strategy 
 I estimated OLS and binary logistic regressions to test the effect of gender on religious 
dependent variables using separate models for Millennials, Generation X’ers, and the Baby 
Boomers, and then discuss the differences between the three cohorts.  I used four different 
dependent variables in my analysis that pertain to religious behavior and beliefs (see Gay and 
Lynxwiler, 2013; Schwadel, 2011): religious service attendance, frequency of prayer, belief in 
the afterlife, and biblical literalism.  Belief in the afterlife taps a standard religious belief across 
religious traditions in the United States and biblical literalism is a measure of conservative 
Christian beliefs (Schwadel, 2011).  Attendance at religious services and frequency of prayer are 
variables that tap actual religious participation (Gay and Lynxwiler, 2013; Schwadel, 2011).  My 
main independent variable is gender.  My control variables included religious affiliation as 
designated by Steensland (2000) and standard demographic variables including age, income, 
education, region of residence, race, ethnicity, work status, and marital status that have an 
established relationship with religious variables in the literature.  The reason for using affiliation 
as a control is due to the fact that it is a commonly used as a measure of religious identity in the 
literature and also because different faiths vary in how often they congregate, which makes 
affiliation relevant to attendance at religious services.    
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I performed the appropriate bivariate tests for gender and the dependent variables.  I 
estimated t-tests for the two dependent variables that are continuous, prayer and attendance, 
and two chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for the two dichotomous variables, biblical literalism 
and belief in life after death.  I then estimated OLS regressions for the continuous variables and 
binary logistic regressions for the dichotomous dependent variables, controlling for the other 
variables.  For my regressions, I have two models for each table pertaining to the appropriate 
dependent variables.  I have a total of twelve models for all three generations.  I have checked 
my regressions for problems such as issues of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, etc.  The 
models are free from multicollinearity (VIF means < 2) and other issues.   
Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses are based on a two-tailed test at a 95% confidence interval.   
H0:  There is no gender difference between generations regarding attendance at religious 
services.  
H1: There is a gender difference between generations regarding attendance at religious 
services. 
H0: There is no gender difference between generations regarding frequency of prayer.  
H1: There is a gender difference between generations regarding frequency of prayer. 
H0:  There is no gender difference between generations regarding belief in the afterlife.  
H1:  There is a gender difference between generations regarding belief in the afterlife. 
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H0: There is no gender difference between generations regarding biblical literalism.   
H1: There is a gender difference between generations regarding biblical literalism. 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
Attendance at religious services.  Participation in religious services “attend” is a 
variable that measures public commitment to a religion and is a measure of religiosity.  The GSS 
has a question about attendance at religious services that asks “How often do you attend 
religious services?” The optional responses are on a scale from 0 = never, 1 = less than once a 
year, 2 = once a year, 3 = several times a year, 4 = once a month, 5 = 2-3 times a month, 6 = 
nearly every week, 7 = every week, 8 = more than once a week, and 9 = don’t know/not 
applicable.  I will only use the valid responses for all questions in this analysis. 
Prayer.  The variable “pray” is a continuous variable that measures frequency of prayer 
and is coded 1 “several times a day,” 2 “once a day,” 3 “several times a week,” 4 “once a week,” 
5 “less than once a week,” and 6 “never.” I will recode this so that higher scores equate to more 
frequent prayer.   
Belief in the Afterlife.  The “postlife” variable is a categorical measure in the GSS that 
asks the question, “Do you believe in life after death?”  I will recode the answers so that “yes” is 
coded 1 and “no” is coded 0.   
29 
 
Belief in Biblical Literalism.  The “bible” variable is a categorical measure that asks the 
question, “Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the 
Bible?” The possible responses are: the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken 
literally, word for word; the Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be 
taken literally, word for word; the Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral 
precepts recorded by men; and other.  I will recode this into a dichotomous variable where  
“belief that the Bible is the actual word of God” is coded 1 and all other responses are coded 0 
(Schwadel, 2011).   
Independent Variables 
Females.  Gender is the main predictor variable in this analysis.  I recoded the variable 
“sex” so that females are coded 1 and males are coded 0. 
Religious Affiliation (several variables).  A series of religious affiliation variables have 
been created based on the variable “reltrad” (see Streensland, Brian, Jerry Park, Mark 
Regnerus, Lynn Robinson, W. Bradford Wilcox, and Robert Woodberry 2000).  This is a 
categorical variable where “Evangelical Protestant” is coded 1, “Mainline Protestant” is coded 
2, “Black Protestant” is coded 3, “Catholic” is coded 4, “Other Faith” is coded 5, and “No 
Religion” is coded 6.  I leave out “Jews” from the analysis because there are not enough of 
them to include for any of the generations.  From the variable “reltrad” I created dummy 
variables for each of the affiliations and used Evangelical Protestants as the reference category.  
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I kept religious affiliation in the analysis as an independent variable to simply control for the 
different affiliations that respondents belong to.   
Control Variables 
 Age, Respondent’s Income, Bible Belt, Education, Work Status, Marital Status, children 
and Race.  The variable for “age” is a continuous variable that varies in range depending on the 
years of birth for each generation. The variable for respondent’s income “income06” is 
measured on a 25-point scale where the lowest category is less than $1000 and the highest 
category is $150,000 or more.  I imputed the mean for the missing data in this variable to 
increase the useable sample size.  
 Southern residence is taken into account because of the higher correlation of religious 
participation in the south (due to the Bible Belt).  Therefore, a dummy variable was created 
from the variable “region” for the Bible Belt, such that living in this region is coded 1 and all 
others are coded 0.  Education or “educ” is a variable based on the highest year of school 
completed by the respondents and is a 21-point scale, from 0 to 20.   
 Work Status variables are a series of dummy variables that I created from the variable 
“wrkstat.” They are based on the coding strategy of Brooks and Bolzendahl (2004).  “Wrkstat” is 
a categorical variable where “working full-time” = 1, “working part-time” = 2, “temporarily not 
working” = 3, “unemployed/laid off” = 4, “retired” = 5, “school” = 6, “keeping house” = 7, and 
“other” = 8.  Dummy variables are constructed from these according to the availability of data 
for each category.  The dummy variable “unemployed” contains the variables “unemployed/laid 
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off,” “retired,” and “temporarily not working.” All the other dummy variables contain only the 
data indicated by their original name.  “Full time work” is the reference category.   
 Marital status or “marital” is divided into three dummy variables including “married or 
widowed,” “divorced or separated,” and “single.”  Married or widowed people represent the 
reference category and are simply labeled “married.”  Divorced or separated is similarly 
simplified to “divorced.”  The number of children, “childs,” a respondent has is a continuous 
variable that has a variable range, depending on the generation.  Dummy variables are created 
to distinguish non-Hispanic African American respondents, non-Hispanic white respondents, 
non-Hispanic other race respondents, and Hispanic respondents.   “White” is the reference 
category.  This is meant to address the correlation between race, ethnicity and religious 
attendance, where African Americans and Hispanic/Latino people typically correlate to higher 
religious attendance. 
Contributions 
 There are several main benefits that this research contributes to the overall literature.  
First, since there has been reason to believe that culture change and ideology shifts over time 
and can contribute to changes in religious beliefs and behaviors in addition to socialization 
during youth.  My investigation contributes to our understanding of the changes that are 
occurring.   
The most important aspect of this study is determining the gender difference across 
three generations regarding religious beliefs and behaviors—something that has not been 
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investigated previously.  Understanding if gender differences still exist in this area is important 
because it speaks to a longstanding trend in the literature on religion and any shifts are liable to 
indicate salient societal changes that are worth examining.   
Additionally, there is a need of further investigation into the study of the religious 
beliefs of the Millennials in general since they are due to be the biggest generation since the 
Baby Boomers and they are going to have a significant impact on the social stage for the next 
fifty years.  The more that we know about them in general, the better we will be able to 
understand and predict the kind of impact they will have on social institutions like religion and 
social constructions of gender.  Already this generation is demonstrating that they are 
continuing the trend established by the Baby Boomers toward religious individualism, attending 
religious services less, and become religious “nones.” Jeffrey Arnett’s (2002) work has 
contributed to our understanding of how Millennials construct their religious beliefs, which 
echoes the “Shielaism” of the Baby Boomers (Bellah et al., 1985).  This present study expands 
on that research by examining the relationship of religious beliefs and behaviors with gender.  
 Also, this study examines the current influence of gender in religion.  Because religion 
has been a historically female dominated sphere of society in terms of membership, beliefs, 
and participation, significant changes are valuable indicators of possible cultural change.  For 
example, some social scientists are indicating that Millennials and Generation X’ers have grown 
up in a more egalitarian culture, which may be affecting their religious participation, beliefs, 
and behaviors.  Since growing up with the idea that equality and diversity is normative has 
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affected other spheres like the family (see Gerson, 2010), the same effect could be occurring 
with regard to religious institutions.  And though this study is not specifically addressing what 
may or may not be different culturally—it is a needful assessment of whether or not the 
symptoms are there to indicate a cultural change is occurring and affecting these three 
generations at their current point in the life course.    
 Regarding the institution of religion in American society, big changes could be on the 
way as well and this research is a useful piece to gauge future trends.  Besides simply looking at 
affiliation, which has been criticized as a measure of background socialization as mentioned 
earlier (see Trzebiatowska, 2012), and attendance, which only looks at physical presence at 
religious services—this study examines more personal aspects of religiosity, specifically, the 
beliefs of the individuals in these three cohorts actually have concerning issues of life after 
death, the Bible, and how much they pray.  The importance of this approach has already been 
indicated for Millennials in the study conducted by Jeffrey Arnett (2002) when he discovered 
how Millennials were shying away from organized religion and heading in the direction of Baby 
Boomer “Sheilaism” (see Bellah, 1985) where they are constructing their own personal 
religions.  This study offers some additional clues to understanding the effects of gender and 
the determinants on these beliefs for all three groups. 
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Strengths and Limitations 
 One of the limitations of this study is that I cannot directly address cultural change as 
part of the analysis, so I will be limited in the scope of the analysis to just the gender 
differences by cohort in terms of religious belief and behavior.  I am also limited from using 
additional belief variables such as belief in hell, miracles, and the like because of the low 
response rate for some of these variables.  Also, because I am using secondary data and 
statistical analysis to test my hypotheses, I cannot determine in any definitive way the 
explanation for the results of my findings.  As such, I will be limited to the established 
knowledge gathered previously in the literature to make sense of the results.  I am also limited 
by the fact that I am conducting a cross-sectional analysis, which limits my perspective of the 
changes I am investigating to a single point in time, whereas a longitudinal panel study could be 
more advantageous for understanding changes over time.  Again, I am relying on what has been 
historically relevant for each cohort in the literature to assist in my analysis of the results.     
 Fortunately, I have a significantly large sample size since I pooled respondents from the 
years 2012 and 2014 for the Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials, which allows me to 
have generalizable results.  Also, in using the General Social Survey I used a nationally 
representative survey that is used in many studies on religion and is respected by major 
journals in the field.  This is also recent data, which is appropriate and useful in contributing to 
the overall literature.  Finally, I have conducted a study that is examining timely and relevant 
issues in the area of cohort, period, and age effects, gender inequalities, and religion.  
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RESULTS 
 All tables discussed in the results section below are listed in the Appendix at the end of 
this paper and a list of the available tables is presented at the beginning of this document. The 
basic descriptive information and results are described here, whereas a detailed comparison 
between the generations is made during the discussion and conclusions section.    
Millennials 
Descriptive Data Results 
 Table one shows the means and percentages of the 794 Millennial men and women in 
the sample, as well as standard deviations and ranges of the various variables.  In the first 
section displaying the information for the four dependent variables, the average attendance 
rate for Millennials is 2.976, which means that Millennials are attending religious services about 
several times a year on average.  On the other hand, Millennials pray more than they attend 
religious services.  The average amount that Millennials pray is 3.618 on the scale, indicating 
that Millennials pray somewhere between once and several times a week.  Additionally, 71.54% 
of Millennials believe that the Bible is either the inspired or literal word of God and 77.71% 
believe in the existence of life after death.   
 Table one also shows information for the sociodemographic variables and religious 
identification variables included in the analysis.  The average age of Millennials sampled is 
roughly 27 years old.  The average income for these Millennials is 15.473, meaning the average 
total family income is between $25,000 and $34,999 a year.  These Millennials report a 13.505 
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mean for education level, meaning that on average they have at little more than one year of 
college education.  If these Millennials have children, they have close to one child only on 
average.  Additionally, women comprise a little over half of the sample at 52.14%.   
 Regarding Christian religious identification, Evangelical Protestants make up 21.79% of 
the total sample, Black Protestants comprise 7.81%, Mainline Protestants represent 5.79%, and 
Catholics represent the largest category--24.56%.  Millennials that claim affiliation with a 
religion other than Christianity comprise 8.69% of the sample.  Finally, those that do not 
identify with any religious faith make up 31.36% of the sample.      
    Additionally, the percentage of Millennials living in the Bible Belt of the United States 
is 25.19.  White Millennials comprise the majority of the sample at 55.04%, followed by 
Hispanic/Latino Millennials (regardless of race) at 22.04%, Black Millennials at 17.63%, and 
Millennials from other races at 5.29%.   
 The majority of Millennials in the sample are employed full-time (51.51%), which is 
unsurprising considering that the average age of Millennials sampled is about 27 years old and 
many of them would be out school completely by that time.  Beyond these, 18.01% of the 
Millennials are working at least part time.  Only 7.68% are temporarily not working, retired, or 
unemployed.  Students make up 12.59% of the sample and full-time stay at home Millennials 
comprise 10.20% of the sample.  Additionally, the data on marital status shows that 28.21% of 
Millennials are currently married, while 6.30% are divorce, and the majority--65.49%--are 
currently single.   
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Multiple Regression Results 
 Table two displays the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the variables’ 
impact on attendance at religious services and frequency of prayer for Millennials.  All models 
are statistically significant.  The attendance at religious services model explains 35% of the 
variance (F = 22.34, p < .001) and the frequency of prayer model explains 38.6% of the variance 
(F = 25.95, p < .001) for Millennials (adjusted R square).  In an analysis not shown, the t-test 
results for both dependent variables and the main predictor variable “gender” were significant, 
indicating a significant difference in means by gender for both attendance at religious services 
(p < .01) and prayer (p < .001).   
 The regression for attendance at religious services shows significant results for gender, 
all religious affiliation variables, education, being African American, divorced, and single.  First 
of all, when holding constant all the variables in the model, Millennial women attend religious 
services more than men.  Black Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Millennials 
identifying with other faith all attend religious services less than Evangelical Protestants, 
holding constant the other factors.  Not surprisingly, those without a religious identification are 
significantly less likely to attend religious services than Evangelical Protestants as well.  For 
every year increase in education that Millennials receive, there is a corresponding .073 increase 
in attendance at religious services, controlling for the other variables.  African Americans attend 
religious services more than whites do, controlling for the other variables.  Marital status also 
matters.  Millennials who are divorced or single are less likely to attend religious services 
compared to those who are married, controlling for the other variables.  
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 The second model shows significant results for gender, being Black Protestant, Catholic, 
an “other” faith, no religious affiliation, living in the Bible Belt of the South, being Hispanic, and 
being African American on frequency of prayer.  Females are significantly more likely to pray 
than males, controlling for the other factors in the model.  Additionally, Black Protestants, 
Catholics, people with other faiths, and people not identifying with a religious tradition are all 
less likely to pray compared to Evangelical Protestants, net the effects of the other variables.  
Living in the Bible Belt South also has a significant positive relationship on prayer compared to 
those living in the other parts of the country, holding constant the other factors.  Finally, black 
respondents and Hispanic or Latin respondents pray more than white respondents, net the 
effects of the control variables.    
Logistic Regression Results 
 Table 3 shows the Logistic Regression results for the variables impact on belief in the 
Bible as the word of God and belief in life after death for Millennials.  Both models in the 
logistic regression table are significant.  In an analysis not shown, the Chi square goodness-of-fit 
results are not significant for gender and belief in the Bible as the word of God, but are 
significant for belief in life after death (Χ2 = 5.949, p < .05). 
For belief in the Bible as the word of God, there are significant results for being Black 
Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Catholic, other religion or faith, no religious identification, 
living in the South, and being African American.  According to Table 3, Black Protestants display 
a 2.905 lower log of the odds of belief in the Bible as the word of God compared to Evangelical 
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Protestants, net the effects of the other variables.  The odds of Mainline Protestants believing 
in the Bible are .147 times less than the odds of Evangelical Protestants, controlling for the 
other variables in the model.  Additionally, the odds for Catholics believing the Bible is the word 
of God are .046 less than the odds of Evangelical Protestants and this pattern holds for both 
those with no religious preference and those of different faiths, net the effects of the other 
variables.  The odds of believing in the Bible are 2.064 higher than for Millennials living in the 
south compared to those living elsewhere in the country, net the effects of the control 
variables.  Also being African American corresponds to a .725 higher log of the odds in belief in 
the Bible compared to white respondents, holding constant the other variables.   
 According to the model displaying the impact of the variables on belief in life after 
death, there are significant findings for gender, being Catholic, identifying with another faith 
other than Christianity, and having no religious preference.  First of all, the odds of females 
believing in life after death are 1.609 times greater than those of males, net the effects of the 
controls.  Catholics, other faith adherents, and respondents claiming no religious affiliation 
have a .745, 1.190, and 2.271 lower log of the odds (respectively) in belief in life after death 
compared to Evangelical Protestants, holding constant the other factors.    
Generation X 
Descriptive Data Results 
 Table four shows the descriptive results for the 966 men and women of Generation X.  
The average attendance for Generation X'ers is 3.609, meaning that these men and women 
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attend religious services somewhere between several times a year and once a month.  
Generation X participants pray on average somewhere between once a day and several times a 
week.  The majority of them believe--80.02%--believe that the Bible is either the inspired or 
literal word of God and 79.40% believe in life after death.  
 The average age of those sample in Generation X is about 40 years old.  The average 
income for Generation X men and women is 18.170, meaning they make between $40,000 and 
$49,999 a year on average.  The education level for these respondents shows that the majority 
of them have at least two years of college education. The average number of children for Gen 
X'ers is two.  Women comprise more than half the sample at 57.35%.   
 Regarding Christian religious identification, Generation X'ers make up 26.71% of 
Evangelical Protestants, 7.35% of Black Protestants, 11.28% of Mainline Protestants, and 
27.12% of Catholics.  The percentage of respondents that identified with a religion other than 
Christianity is 6.52.  Additionally, those proclaiming no religious affiliation comprise 21.01% of 
the sample.   
 Gen X'ers living in the Bible Belt make up 26.92% of the sample.  Racially, 59.73% of the 
respondents are white, 19.88 are Hispanic or Latino, 14.80 are black, and 5.59% self-report that 
they are of some other race.  The majority of the sample, 67.08%, report that they are 
employed full time, while 10.25% say they are employed part time.  Those that are 
unemployed, temporarily not working, or retired make up 7.56% of the sample.  Finally, 
respondents that stay at home full-time comprise 15.11% of the sample. The marital status of 
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these individuals shows that the majority--57.56%--are married or widowed.  Alternatively, 
20.08% are divorced or separated, and 22.36% are single.   
Multiple Regression Results 
 Table five displays the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the variables’ 
impact on attendance at religious services and frequency of prayer for Generation X.  Both 
models are significant.  Model 1 explains 31.5% of the variance (F = 24.32, p < .001) in 
attendance at religious services and Model 2 explains 30.5% of the variance (F = 23.30, p < .001) 
in frequency of prayer (based on adjusted r-square).  In an analysis not shown, the t-test results 
for attendance at religious services and the main predictor variable “gender” was not 
significant, but the results were significant for frequency of prayer and gender (p < .001). 
In model 1, there are significant results for Black Protestants, Mainline Protestants, 
Catholics, other faiths, no religious preference, education, being African American, divorced, 
and single.  Regarding the impact of gender, interestingly, there is no difference between men 
and women for attendance at religious services, net the effect of the controls.  Alternatively, 
every religious preference is correlated to a negative relationship with attendance at religious 
services compared to Evangelical Protestants.  For every year increase in education there is a 
.082 increase in religious service attendance, controlling for the other factors.  Blacks have a 
.986 higher attendance compared to whites, net the other factors.  Being divorced corresponds 
to 1.025 more negative attendance rates compared to married people, controlling the other 
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variables.  Similarly, single Gen X’ers attend religious services less than married ones, net the 
effects of the other variables.  
Model 2 displays significant results for gender, Christian religious affiliations, no 
religious preference, Hispanic ethnicity, African American, Homemakers, Divorced people, and 
those with children.  Females have .582 higher scores than males, meaning Generation X 
women pray more than their male counterparts, net the effects of the other variables.  Black 
Protestants, Mainline Protestants, and Catholics all pray less than Evangelical Protestants, 
controlling for the other factors.  Unsurprisingly, people with no religious preference also pray 
less than Evangelical Protestants.  Alternatively, Hispanics and African Americans both pray 
more than whites, net the effects of the other variables.  Interestingly, homemakers have .339 
lower scores on the prayer scale than full time workers, controlling for the other variables.  
Divorced people also pray less than married people.  Finally, for every additional child, there is a 
.077 increase in prayer, net the effects of the other factors.   
Logistic Regression Results 
 Table 6 displays the results for the impact of the determinants on belief in the Bible as 
the word of God and belief in life after death for Generation X.  Both models in the table are 
significant.  In an analysis not shown, the Chi square goodness-of-fit results are significant for 
gender and belief in the Bible as the word of God (Χ2 = 6.513, p < .05) and for belief in life after 
death (Χ2 = 17.662, p < .001). 
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 In model 1, Mainline, Catholic, other faith, no religious preference, income, education, 
and Hispanic ethnicity are all significant.  The main predictor, gender is not significant.  On the 
other hand, Mainline Protestants show a 1.479 lower log of the odds of belief in the Bible as the 
word of God compared to Evangelical Protestants, net the effects of the other variables.  This 
negative relationship holds for Catholics, people with other faiths, and those with no religious 
preference compared to Evangelical Protestants, controlling for the other variables.  
Alternatively, for every one-unit increase in income, the odds of believing the Bible is the word 
of God is higher by 1.020, controlling for the other factors.  Interestingly, for every year 
increase in education, there is a .160 lower log of the odds of belief in the Bible as the word of 
God, net the effects of the other variables.  Being Hispanic corresponds to a 1.547 times 
increase in the odds of believing in the Bible as the word of God compared to whites, net the 
effects of the controls.  
Baby Boomers 
Descriptive Data Results 
 Table seven presents descriptive data for the 1,175 Baby Boomers in this study.  On 
average, Baby Boomer men and women attend religious services somewhere between several 
times a year and once a month.  On average they pray somewhere between several times a 
week and once a day.  Roughly the same percentage of people believe that the Bible is the 
word of God that also believe there is life after death, 80.09% and 80.85%, respectively.  The 
average age of the Baby Boomers in the sample is about 57 years old and the typical income for 
these respondents is between $35,000 and $49,000.  The Baby Boomers also have an average 
44 
 
education level of 13.639, meaning they have an average of almost two years of college 
education completed.  These individuals also have an average of two children.  Females 
outnumber the males as well with females consisting of 52.51% of the sample.   
 In terms of religious identification, those identifying with Evangelical Protestantism 
comprise the biggest category with 28.68% of the sample.  Black Protestants comprise 7.74%, 
Mainline Protestants comprise 16%, and Catholics make up 25.96% of Baby Boomer religious 
affiliations.  Alternatively, those reporting identification with a non-Christian faith or religion 
make up the smallest category at 5.62%.  Those claiming no religious affiliation whatsoever 
make up 16% of the total sample.   
 The percentage of Baby Boomers living in the southern Bible Belt is 28.94.  A full 70.13% 
of the sample is white, 10.81% are of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, and 15.06% are black.  
Additionally, Baby Boomers of an “other” race make up only 4% of the sample.  Baby Boomers 
who are full time workers make up 52.09% of the sample, while part time workers are only 
9.87% of the sample.  Those that are retired, not working temporarily, or unemployed comprise 
a significant aggregate--24.77 of the total respondents.  Those that report they are students 
make up 7.83% of the sample and homemakers comprise 5.45% of the participants.  
Additionally, more than half, 58.98%, are married or widowed.  Those that are divorced or 
separated make up 28.68% of the participants and 12.34% are currently single.   
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Multiple Regression Results 
 Table 8 displays the Ordinary Least Squares regression results for the variables’ impact 
on attendance at religious services and frequency of prayer for the 1175 Baby Boomers in this 
study.  Both models are significant.  Model 1 explains 32.8% of the variance (F = 28.21, p < .001) 
in attendance at religious services and Model 2 explains 36.7% of the variance (F = 33.48, p < 
.001) in frequency of prayer (based on adjusted r-square).  In an analysis not shown, the t-test 
results for both dependent variables and the main predictor variable “gender” were significant, 
indicating a significant difference in means by gender for both attendance at religious services 
(p < .001) and prayer (p < .001). 
 In model 1 there are significant results for gender, all religious identification variables, 
education, southern residence, all race and ethnicity variables, divorced marital status, and 
having children.  Regarding the main predictor, gender, females have .426 higher scores on the 
attendance at religious services scale than males, holding constant the other factors.  
Evangelical Protestants attend religious services more than Black Protestants, Mainline 
Protestants, Catholics, those with non-Christian faiths, and those without religious affiliation, 
controlling for the other variables.  For every year increase in education, there is a 
corresponding .099 increase in attendance at religious services for Baby Boomers, net the 
effects of the other variables.  Additionally, Baby Boomers living in the South attend religious 
services more than their counterparts in the rest of the country, when controlling the other 
variables.  After accounting for the other factors, Hispanics, African Americans, and people of 
other races all attend religious services at higher rates than white Baby Boomers.  Divorced 
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people have .485 lower scores on the attendance at religious services scale than married 
people; net the effects of the other controls.  Finally, for every child a Baby Boomer has, the 
likelihood of attending religious services increases by .191, net the effects of the other factors.   
 Model 2 displays significant effects for gender, all Christian religious affiliations, no 
religious affiliation, living in the Bible Belt, being African American, and having children.  When 
controlling for the other factors, women pray more than men.  Evangelical Protestants pray 
more than Black Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Catholics, people of other faiths, and those 
with no religious preference, holding constant the other factors.  After accounting for the other 
variables, Baby Boomers living in the Bible Belt have .333 higher scores on the prayer scale than 
those living elsewhere in the United States.  Additionally, African Americans pray more than 
whites, holding constant the other factors.  Finally, for every additional child Baby Boomers 
have, there is a .082 increase in prayer, net the effects of the controls.      
Logistic Regression Results 
 Table 9 displays the results for the impact of the determinants on belief in the Bible as 
the word of God and belief in life after death for the Baby Boomers (N = 1175).  Models 1 and 2 
in the table are significant (Χ2 = 290.12, p < .001 and Χ2 = 159.08, p < .001, respectively).  In an 
analysis not shown, the chi square goodness-of-fit results are significant for gender and belief in 
the Bible as the word of God (Χ2 = 20.399, p < .001) and for belief in life after death (Χ2 = 6.483, 
p < .05). 
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 In model 1, Mainline, Catholic, other religious faith, no religious preference, education 
and Hispanic ethnicity are all significant predictors of belief in the Bible as the word of God.  
The main predictor, gender is not significant.  On the other hand, Mainline Protestants display 
.848 lower log odds of belief in the Bible as the word of God compared to Evangelical 
Protestants, net the effects of the other variables.  Similarly, the odds of Catholics believing the 
Bible is the word of God are .309 times less than Evangelical Protestants, holding constant the 
other factors.  Unsurprisingly, the odds of those with alternative religious faiths from 
Christianity and those with no religious preference believing the Bible is the Word of God are 
lower than for Evangelical Protestants, controlling for the other factors.  Alternatively, when 
there is an increase in education, the odds of believing the Bible is the word of God is lower by  
.898, controlling for the other factors.  Baby Boomers living in the South have .575 higher log of 
the odds of belief in the Bible is the word of God compared to those living elsewhere, 
controlling for the other factors.   
 Model 2 displays significant results for Mainline Protestants, Catholics, other religious 
faiths, no religious preference, and being Hispanic.  The main predictor, gender is not 
significant.  However, for Mainline Protestants the log of the odds of belief in life after death is 
.893 higher compared to Evangelical Protestants, net the effects of the other variables.  
Similarly, the log-odds of believing in life after death for Catholics is 1.099 lower than that of 
Evangelical Protestants, holding constant the other factors.  For those with alternative religious 
faiths from Christianity and those with no religious preference, the odds of believing in life after 
death are lower than for Evangelical Protestants, controlling for the other factors.  Lastly, there 
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is a .651 higher log of the odds of belief in life after death for Baby Boomers of Hispanic or 
Latino ethnicity compared to non-Hispanic whites, controlling for the other factors.   
 Regarding the findings, I reject the null that there is no gender difference between 
generations regarding attendance at religious services.   However, I failed to reject the null that 
there is no gender difference between generations regarding frequency of prayer.   On the 
other hand, I was able to reject the null that there is no gender difference between generations 
regarding belief in the afterlife.  Similarly, I reject the null that there is no gender difference 
between generations regarding biblical literalism.    
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The descriptive tables reveal noteworthy differences in religious beliefs and behaviors 
between Millennials, Generation X, and Baby Boomers.  Consistent with the literature, 
Millennials are marked by the least amount of average religious service attendance, followed by 
Generation X, and Baby Boomers.   The dispersion about the mean also suggests that more 
Millennials are more tightly clustered around this average of only once a year to several times a 
year compared to either Generation X or Baby Boomers.  Indeed, Baby Boomers have the 
largest amount of variation in this respect.     
 The same pattern follows with prayer, with Millennials being the least prayerful and 
Baby Boomers praying the most.  Generation X is somewhere in between.  However, in regard 
to prayer, dispersion about the mean is in reversed pattern from attendance at religious 
services.  For Millennials there is greater variation, followed by Generation X, and the least 
amount of dispersion from the mean exists for Baby Boomers.  This means that greater 
numbers of Baby Boomers follow the trend average amount of prayer and more Millennials 
deviate from the average.   
 For belief in the Bible as the word of God and belief in life after death, the greatest 
amount of difference exists for Millennials, whereas Generation X and Baby Boomers have 
similar levels of belief in favor of both.  Millennials are the most skeptical—at least where the 
Bible is concerned.  All of these findings are consistent with trends that show lower religiosity at 
younger ages due to a variety of factors including a decreased influence of religious authority 
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(Chaves, 1994), delayed adulthood rites of passage such as marriage and having children 
(Wuthnow, 1988; Arnett, 2000), and general patterns of life cycle trends (Firebaugh, 1991).   
 The present study does not test declining religious authority, emerging adulthood, or life 
cycle trends, but the descriptive information does hint at their effects.  Regarding declining 
religious authority, support in the data comes from the religious affiliation numbers that show 
Millennials are the most likely to reject a religious affiliation of the three generations.  At the 
same time, a higher percentage of Millennials belong to alternative faiths and non-Christian 
religions compared to Baby Boomers and Generation X.  Amid a general trend of decline in the 
other Christian religious categories, the data suggests something more complex than declining 
religious authority.  Perhaps instead there is declining Christian authority amid rising curiosity 
about alternative religious options.    
The data also show that Millennials are delaying marriage and children to later ages, a 
main characteristic of emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000).  Specifically, the average age of the 
Millennials surveyed is about 27 years old and over 65% of these Millennials are single with less 
than one child on average.  Only a little more than a quarter of them are married.  A major 
reason given for this delaying of marriage and children is that recent generations of young 
adults are attending higher educational institutions like colleges and universities in greater 
numbers (Arnett, 2000; Arnett 2002).  The data in this study support this premise, showing that 
the average educational level of the Millennials is some college with a standard deviation that 
suggests a significant number of the Millennials are well educated.   
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 In terms of other demographics, the Millennials have the least amount of total family 
income, followed by the Baby Boomers, and Generation X averages the most.  This makes sense 
since many Baby Boomers have started retiring and many Millennials are just starting their 
careers.  The data show that Baby Boomers have the greatest number of people not working 
compared to either the Millennials or Generation X with nearly 25%.  This percentage dwarfs 
the approximate 8% of the Millennials and Generation X’ers not currently working. 
 The main predictor in this study, gender, shows that women in all three generations 
outnumber the men in the sample.  Millennials have 52% that are women, Generation X has 
57%, and the Baby Boomers have 53% that are women.  Millennials are also the most racially 
diverse of the three cohorts, followed by Generation X and the Baby Boomers.  However, 
whites make up over half of all three aggregates.  Minorities are still in the minority. 
 Regarding attendance at religious services, there are some interesting differences 
between the three generations.  Gender is not a significant predictor of religious service 
attendance only for Generation X when controlling for the other factors, which is an unusual 
finding since gender is typically always a predictor of religious service attendance.  Beyond that, 
there are some other differences between the cohorts worth mentioning.  Region is only a 
significant predictor for Baby Boomers, indicating that living in the Bible Belt is no longer a 
determinant of religious service attendance for either of the younger generations.  This could 
be another symptom of declining Christian religious authority as described by Chaves (1994).  
Additionally, there are racial differences.  For Baby Boomers, being Hispanic, African American, 
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and of another race all predict higher rates of religious participation compared to whites, but 
for Generation X, only being Hispanic and African American are significantly relevant.  For 
Millennials, only African Americans positively predict significantly more religious service 
attendance than whites.  The changing demographics of each generation—in this case the 
increase in minorities—could be playing a part in why this pattern of race is becoming less 
relevant in each successive generation.  Marital status and children are also factors that mark 
clear differences between the generations.  For both Millennials and Generation X, divorced 
and single people both attend religious services less than married people, but children make no 
difference.  Since children are a classic reason in the literature for participation in religious 
institutions (see Wuthnow, 1988), this finding is surprising.  Even though divorced people still 
negatively predict participation in religious services for Baby Boomers, having children does 
increase their likelihood of participating.   
 For frequency of prayer, women in all three cohorts pray more than men.  However, 
there are differences with regard to the religious affiliation variables.  Mainline Protestants 
have an effect on prayer compared to Evangelicals only for Generation X and Baby Boomers, 
but not for Millennials.  On the other hand, people with other faiths have predictive effects only 
for Millennials.  The nature of this finding is unclear and the reasons for it are somewhat vague; 
further investigation in the future is warranted to bring clarification.  Southern residence 
displays another strange finding; it is predictive of higher levels of prayer for Millennials and 
Baby Boomers, but not for Generation X.  Also being Hispanic and African American predict 
higher levels of prayer for both Millennials and Generation X, but being Hispanic has no effect 
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for Baby Boomers.  Having children is another point of departure between the cohorts.  For 
Baby Boomers and Generation X, having more children leads to more prayer.  For Millennials, 
children have no effect on prayer at all.  Additionally, only for Generation X does being divorced 
or a homemaker correspond with less prayer as compared to married people.   
 For belief in the Bible as the word of God, gender is not a predictive factor except for 
the Baby Boomers.  Female Baby Boomers have higher odds of believing in the authority of the 
Bible compared to males.  For both Millennials and Generation X, on the other hand, there is no 
gender difference.   Additionally, for Millennials, Evangelical Protestants are more likely to 
believe in the Bible as the word of God compared to all other religious affiliations.  
Alternatively, Baby Boomer and Generation X Black Protestants show no difference in belief 
from Evangelical Protestants, even though the difference holds for all the others.  Additional 
differences exist in regards to income and education levels.  For Millennials, neither education 
nor income has a relationship to belief in the Bible.  For Generation X, higher income is 
associated positively with belief in the Bible and higher education is negatively associated with 
it.  For Baby Boomers, only education is a determinant of unbelief regarding the Bible.  Living in 
the Bible Belt is another distinguishing factor.  For Millennials and the Baby Boomers, living in 
the South increases the odds of belief in the Bible, whereas it has no effect on Generation X.  
Race is also a differentiating factor.  African American Millennials have greater odds of believing 
in the Bible than white Millennials, but that effect does not extend to Generation X or the Baby 
Boomers.  For Generation X, on the other hand, being Hispanic increases the odds of believing 
in the Bible.  For Baby Boomers there is no racial effect.   
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 The last model displaying the results for belief in life after death shows additional 
differences.  Women believe in life after death more than men for Generation X and 
Millennials, but not for Baby Boomers.  Baby Boomers that are Evangelical Protestants are more 
likely to believe in life after death than Mainline Protestants, Catholics, people with other 
faiths, and people with no religion.  However for Millennials, this pattern exists only for 
Catholics, people with other faiths, and those with no religion.  The starkest contrast exists for 
Generation X, where the only significant result exists for those with no religious affiliation.  
Beyond the religious variables and gender, only being Hispanic is a significant predictor for both 
Baby Boomers and Generation X.  Ethnicity makes no difference in belief in life after death for 
Millennials, however.  Another unusual finding is that being a homemaker is a negative 
predictor of belief in life after death. 
 In conclusion, the models in this exploratory study do show distinctions between the 
generations with regards to gender and the other predictors, though maybe not all in predictive 
trends.  It is clear that the demographics are changing for the newer generations and there are 
some indications that successive generations are becoming less involved in religious 
participation overall.  Additionally, the finding of no gender effect on attendance at religious 
services for Generation X is unusual.  Future studies could investigate the trend by which 
gender is becoming less of a factor in certain religious beliefs rather than in others.  For 
example, where gender predicts belief in the word of God, but not life after death.  AS such, 
gender is becoming less of a differentiating factor for a Christian belief (belief in the Bible as the 
word of God) and more of a factor with regard to a belief that span across religious faiths (belief 
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in life after death).  That being said, women seem to be strongly oriented toward prayer, 
regardless of generation.  That finding lends support to the position of Jeffrey Arnett (2002) and 
Wade Roof (1993) that religion seems to be becoming more privatized.  Thus the finding that 
successive generations are attending religious services less may only be an indication of less 
public support for organized religion and a greater personal, private commitment in the form of 
prayer, especially among women.  Additional research is warranted to investigate these 
findings further.   
 In conclusion, this research shows that women still are more religious than men in all 
three generations.  Regarding prayer specifically, women from all three cohorts pray more than 
men.  Additionally, there are some religious categories where there is no gender difference.  On 
the other hand, when there is a gender difference, women show greater religious tendencies 
than men and there are no instances where men are more religious than women.  Future work 
could investigate the gender differences in religiosity further by examining additional religious 
beliefs and behaviors, as well as investigate differences related to the findings of this study. 
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APPENDIX: TABLES  
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Table 1: Means/Proportions, Standard Deviations, and Range for Millennials; N= 794 
Variables Mean/Proportion in % Std. Deviation 
Attendance at Religious Services (9 point scale) 2.976 2.664 
Frequency of Prayer (6 point scale) 3.618 1.863 
Belief Bible is Word of God (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 71.54 -- 
Belief in Life After Death (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 77.71 -- 
Age (Year of Birth: 1981 - 1997) 26.976 4.071 
Income (25 point scale) 15.473 6.048 
Education (21 point scale) 13.505 2.576 
Children (7 point scale) .800 1.157 
Sex (Female = 1, Male = 0) 52.14 -- 
Evangelical Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 21.79 -- 
Black Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 7.81 -- 
Mainline Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 5.79 -- 
Catholic (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 24.56 -- 
Other religion/faith (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 8.69 -- 
No religious affiliation (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 31.36 -- 
Southern Residence (1 = Bible Belt, 0 = all others) 25.19 -- 
White (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 55.04 -- 
Hispanic/Latino (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 22.04 -- 
Black (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 17.63 -- 
Other race (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 5.29 -- 
Full time worker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 51.51 -- 
Part time worker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 18.01 -- 
Unemployed or not working (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 7.68 -- 
Student (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 12.59 -- 
Homemaker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 10.20 -- 
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Variables Mean/Proportion in % Std. Deviation 
Married (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 28.21 -- 
Divorced (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 6.30 -- 
Single (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 65.49 -- 
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Table 2: The Impact of Religious Identification and Sociodemographic Variables on the 
Frequency of Attendance at Religious services and Prayer for Millennials (Multiple Regression) 
Independent Variables Attendance at Religious Services (Model 1)  Frequency of Prayer (Model 2) 
Female .420/.079 (.164)* .498/.134 (.111)*** 
Black Protestant -1.596/-.161 (.377)*** -.855/-.123 (.256)** 
Mainline -.827/ -.073 (.362)* -.178/-.022 (.246) 
Catholic -1.554/-251 (.240)*** -.913/-.211 (.163)*** 
Other Religion/Faith -1.166/-.123 (.322)*** -.472/-.071 (.010)* 
No Religion -3.823/ -.664 (.222)*** -2.393/-.596 (.024)*** 
Age -.005/-.008 (.024) .017/.037 (.128) 
Income .019/.044 (.111) -.011/-.036 (.151) 
Education .073/.071 (.256)* .012/.016 (.017)  
Southern Residence .364/.059 (.246) .420/.098 (.010)** 
Hispanic  .334/.052 (.163) .299/.067 (.139)* 
African American .854/.122 (.219)** 1.247/.255 (.177)*** 
Other Race -.549/-.046 (.151) .053/.006 (.249) 
Works Part Time  .006/.001 (.016) -.094/-.019 (.149) 
Unemployed .018/.002 (.010) .093/.013 (.205) 
Student .082/.010 (.024) -.108/-.019 (.177) 
Homemaker -.171/-.019 (.285) .078/.013 (.194) 
Divorced -.982/-.090 (.349)** -.123/-.016 (.237) 
Single -.628/-.112 (.208)** -.266/-.068 (.141) 
Children .016/.007 (.083) .049/.030 (.056) 
Constant 3.641 3.206 
N 794 794 
F Ratio 22.34*** 25.95*** 
R Square .366 .402 
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Adjusted R Square .350 .386 
Cell entries are given as unstandardized regression coefficients/standardized coefficients (Beta) with the standard 
errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.   
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Table 3: The Impact of Religious Identification and Sociodemographic Variables on the Belief 
that the Bible is the Word of God and Belief in Life After Death for Millennials (Logistic 
Regression) 
Independent Variables Bible is Word of God (Model 1)  Life After Death (Model 2) 
Female .207/1.231 (.201) .476/1.609 (.202)* 
Black Protestant -2.905/.055 (.874)** .617/1.853 (.809) 
Mainline -1.919/.147 (.888)* .260/1.297 (.666) 
Catholic -3.088/.046 (.741)*** -.745/.475 (.356)* 
Other Religion/Faith -3.875/.021 (.767)*** -1.190/.304 (.429)** 
No Religion -4.960/.007 (.730)*** -2.271/.103 (.321)*** 
Age -.013/.987 (.030) -.027/.974 (.029) 
Income -.022/.978 (.018) -.002/.998 (.018) 
Education -.006/.994 (.043) -.064/.938 (.043) 
Southern Residence .585/1.795 (.257)* .080/1.083 (.245) 
Hispanic  .368/1.445 (.252) -.431/.650 (.241) 
African American .725/2.064 (.317)* .220/1.247 (.317) 
Other Race .503/1.654 (.395) .389/1.476 (.432) 
Works Part Time  -.163/.850 (.268) .015/1.015 (.268) 
Unemployed -.377/.686 (.371) .671/1.955 (.436) 
Student -.188/.829 (.313) -.120/.887 (.312) 
Homemaker .270/1.310 (.389) -.124/.883 (.361) 
Divorced -.419/.657 (.465) -.127/.881 (.433) 
Single .161/1.174 (.264) .062/1.064 (.256) 
Children .033/1.034 (.108) -.036/.965 (.104) 
Constant 4.798 3.833 
N 794 794 
Chi-square 261.73 133.07 
Pseudo R Square .276 .158 
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Cell entries are given as logistic regression coefficients/odds ratios with the standard errors in parentheses. *p < 
.05, **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 4: Means/Proportions, Standard Deviations, and Range for Generation X; N= 966. 
Variables Mean/Proportion in % Std. Deviation 
Attendance at Religious Services (9 point scale) 3.609 2.797 
Frequency of Prayer (6 point scale) 4.322 1.730 
Belief Bible is Word of God (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 80.02 -- 
Belief in Life After Death (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 79.40 -- 
Age (Year of Birth: 1980 - 1965) 40.403 4.596 
Income (25 point scale) 18.170 5.242 
Education (21 point scale) 13.987 3.161 
Children (9 point scale) 2.006 1.490 
Sex (Female = 1, Male = 0) 57.35 -- 
Evangelical Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 26.71 -- 
Black Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 7.35 -- 
Mainline Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 11.28 -- 
Catholic (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 27.12 -- 
Other religion/faith (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 6.52 -- 
No religious affiliation (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 21.01 -- 
Southern Residence (1 = Bible Belt, 0 = all others) 26.92 -- 
White (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 59.73 -- 
Hispanic/Latino (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 19.88 -- 
Black (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 14.80 -- 
Other race (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 5.59 -- 
Full time worker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 67.08 -- 
Part time worker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 10.25 -- 
Unemployed or not working (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 7.56 -- 
Homemaker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 15.11 -- 
Married (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 57.56 -- 
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Variables Mean/Proportion in % Std. Deviation 
Divorced (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 20.08 -- 
Single (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 22.36 -- 
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Table 5: The Impact of Religious Identification and Sociodemographic Variables on the 
Frequency of Attendance at Religious services and Prayer for Generation X (Multiple 
Regression) 
Independent Variables Attendance at Religious Services (Model 1)  Frequency of Prayer (Model 2) 
Female .110/.019 .582/.167*** 
Black Protestant -1.058/-.099** -.741/-.112** 
Mainline -1.344/-.152*** -.517/-.095** 
Catholic -1.581/-.251*** -.813/-.209*** 
Other Religion/Faith -1.174/-.104** -.341/-.049 
No Religion -4.012/-.585*** -2.143/-.505*** 
Age -.021/-.035 .008/.021 
Income -.001/-.003 -.018/-.053 
Education .082/.093** .007/.013 
Southern Residence -.017/-.003 .194/.050 
Hispanic  .572/.082* .374/.086** 
African American .986/.125** .905/.186*** 
Other Race -.443/-.036 .147/.020 
Works Part Time  .024/.002 -.234/-.041 
Unemployed -.548/-.052 -.361/-.055@ 
Homemaker .028/.004 -.339/-.070* 
Divorced -1.025/-.147*** -.261/-.060* 
Single -.548/-.082* -.028/-.007 
Children .099/.053 .077/.066* 
Constant 4.773 4.436 
N 966 966 
F Ratio 24.32*** 23.30*** 
R Square .328 .319 
Adjusted R Square .315 .305 
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Cell entries are given as unstandardized regression coefficients/standardized coefficients (Beta) with the standard 
errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.   
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Table 6: The Impact of Religious Identification and Sociodemographic Variables on the Belief 
that the Bible is the Word of God and Belief in Life After Death for Generation X (Logistic 
Regression) 
Independent Variables Bible is Word of God (Model 1) Life After Death (Model 2) 
Female .375/1.455 (.221) .557/1.745 (.328)** 
Black Protestant -1.031/.357 (1.197) -.149/.861 (.491) 
Mainline -1.479/.228 (.561)** .130/1.139 (.420) 
Catholic -2.046/.129 (.496)*** -.497/.608 (.156) 
Other Religion/Faith -2.829/.059 (.550)*** -.039/.961 (.426) 
No Religion -4.123/.016 (.482)*** -1.484/.227 (.057)*** 
Age .044/1.045 (.023) -.032/.968 (.019) 
Income .020/1.020 (026)*** -.031/1.050 (.021) 
Education -.160/.852 (.040)* .049/.876 (.032) 
Southern Residence .664/1.942 (.277) -.132/.605 (.181) 
Hispanic  .436/1.547 (.288)** -.503/1.902 (.142)* 
African American 1.451/4.268 (.513) .643/1.234 (.746) 
Other Race .129/1.138 (.393) .210/1.723 (.506) 
Works Part Time  .060/1.062 (.369) .544/1.258 (.598) 
Unemployed .043/1.044 (.382) .229/.544 (.444) 
Homemaker -.621/.537 (.322) -.609/.796 (.142)* 
Divorced -.385/.680 (.280) -.228/.821 (.183) 
Single -.430/.651 (.299) -.198/1.085 (.205) 
Children .105/1.111 (.080) .082/1.085 (.071) 
Constant 3.564 2.824 
N 966 966 
Chi-square 330.27*** 107.70*** 
Pseudo R Square .342 .110 
Cell entries are given as logistic regression coefficients/odds ratios with the standard errors in parentheses. *p < 
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.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table 7: Means/Proportions, Standard Deviations, and Range for Baby Boomers, N= 1175 
Variables Mean/Proportion in % Std. Deviation 
Attendance at Religious Services (9 point scale) 3.743 2.825 
Frequency of Prayer (6 point scale) 4.489 1.664 
Belief Bible is Word of God (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 80.09 -- 
Belief in Life After Death (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 80.85 -- 
Age (Year of Birth: 1946 - 1964) 57.403 5.399 
Income (25 point scale) 17.664 5.408 
Education (21 point scale) 13.639 3.010 
Children (9 point scale) 2.037 1.601 
Sex (Female = 1, Male = 0) 52.51 -- 
Evangelical Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 28.68 -- 
Black Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 7.74 -- 
Mainline Protestant (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 16.00 -- 
Catholic (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 25.96 -- 
Other religion/faith (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 5.62 -- 
No religious affiliation (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 16.00 -- 
Southern Residence (1 = Bible Belt, 0 = all others) 28.94 -- 
White (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 70.13 -- 
Hispanic/Latino (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 10.81 -- 
Black (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 15.06 -- 
Other race (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 4.00 -- 
Full time worker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 52.09 -- 
Part time worker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 9.87 -- 
Unemployed or not working (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 24.77 -- 
Student (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 7.83 -- 
Homemaker (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 5.45 -- 
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Variables Mean/Proportion in % Std. Deviation 
Married (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 58.98 -- 
Divorced (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 28.68 -- 
Single (1 = yes, 0 = all others) 12.34 -- 
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Table 8: The Impact of Religious Identification and Sociodemographic Variables on the 
Frequency of Attendance at Religious services and Prayer for Baby Boomers (Multiple 
Regression) 
Independent Variables Attendance at Religious Services (Model 1) Frequency of Prayer (Model 2) 
Female .426/.075 (.142)** .547/.164 (.081)*** 
Black Protestant -1.573/-.149 (.354)*** -.816/-.131 (.202)*** 
Mainline -1.449/-.188 (.218)*** -1.024/-.226 (.125)*** 
Catholic -1.298/-.201 (.193)*** -.615/-.162 (.110)*** 
Other Religion/Faith -.893/-.073 (.322)** -.314/-.044 (.184) 
No Religion -4.056/-.527 (.223)*** -2.417/-.533 (.127)*** 
Age .009/.016 (.014) .008/.026 (.008) 
Income .002/.003 (.016) -.005/-.015 (.009) 
Education .099/.105 (.026)*** .004/.008 (.015) 
Southern Residence .467/.075 (.156)** .333/.091 (.089)*** 
Hispanic  1.003/.110 (.238)*** .343/.064 (.136) 
African American 1.650/.209 (.264)*** .802/.172 (.151)*** 
Other Race 1.077/.075 (.357)** .022/.003 (.204) 
Works Part Time  .062/.007 (.245) .131/.023 (.140) 
Unemployed .012/.002 (.187) -.133/-.035 (.107) 
Homemaker .003/.000 (.275) -.127/-.020 (.157) 
Other Work Status -.362/-.029 (.318) -.055/-.008 (.182) 
Divorced -.485/-.078 (.170)** .030/.008 (.097) 
Single -.358/-.042 (.242) -.162/-.032 (.138) 
Children .191/.108 (.047)*** .082/.079 (.027)** 
Constant 2.313 4.187 
N 1175 1175 
F Ratio 28.21*** 33.48*** 
R Square .328 .367 
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Adjusted R Square .317 .356 
Cell entries are given as unstandardized regression coefficients/standardized coefficients (Beta) with the standard 
errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.   
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Table 9: The Impact of Religious Identification and Sociodemographic Variables on the Belief 
that the Bible is the Word of God and Belief in Life After Death for Baby Boomers (Logistic 
Regression) 
Independent Variables  Bible is Word of God (Model 1) Life After Death (Model 2) 
Female .453/1.573 (.178)* .077/1.080 (.180) 
Black Protestant -.294/.745 (.657) -.871/.419 (.201) 
Mainline -.848/.428 (.340)* -.893/.409 (.128)** 
Catholic -1.173/.309 (300)*** -1.099/.333 (.091)*** 
Other Religion/Faith -2.148/.117 (.374)*** -1.722/.179 (.066)*** 
No Religion -3.162/.042 (.300)*** -2.588/.075 (.021)*** 
Age -.002/.998 (.017) .002/1.002 (.016) 
Income -.011/.989 (.021) .009/1.009 (.020) 
Education -.107/.898 (.034)** .070/1.073 (.033) 
Southern Residence .575/1.778 (.218)** .058/1.060 (.203) 
Hispanic  .154/1.167 (.287) -.651/.521 (.130)** 
African American .355/1.426 (.363) .186/1.204 (.394) 
Other Race .295/1.343 (.415) .600/1.823 (.813) 
Works Part Time  .411/1.509 (.347) .414/1.512 (.469) 
Unemployed -.178/.837 (.230) .098/1.103 (.241) 
Homemaker -.471/.624 (.348) .332/1.394 (.467) 
Other work status -.466/.628 (.401) .218/1.244 (.472) 
Divorced -.366/.694 (.212) -.084/.919 (.183) 
Single -.127/.881 (.297) -.060/.942 (.252) 
Children .099/1.105 (.064) .079/1.082 (.063) 
Constant 4.242 3.349 
N 1175 1175 
Chi-Square 290.12*** 159.08*** 
Pseudo R Square .2473 .1386 
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Cell entries are given as logistic regression coefficients/odds ratios with the standard errors in parentheses. *p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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